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OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
After having failed in Illinois v. Gates, "with apologies to all," to
address the exclusionary sanction as was expected, the Court in United
States v. Leon2 and Massachusetts v. Sheppard3 announced the long-
anticipated modification ("somewhat") 4 of the exclusionary rule. Much,
no doubt, will be written about these cases. It is appropriate here to
present only a brief analysis.
The Court announced that when an officer relies on a search warrant
lacking probable cause and such reliance was objectively reasonable, the
exclusionary sanction will not apply. The eagerness to reach the exclu-
sionary sanction issue is reflected by the Court's declining to determine
whether probable cause would have existed under Gates.'
Ironically, in terms of judicial method, the opinion parallels that
employed by Justice Clark in Mapp v. Ohio.6 Mapp was based, in part,
upon the conclusion that it "plainly appears that the factual consid-
erations supporting the failure of the Wolf Court to include the Weeks
exclusionary rule . . . while not basically relevant to the constitutional
consideration, could not, in any analysis, now be deemed controlling." '7
In Leon, Justice White, who wrote for the majority, noted in
examining the factual considerations that
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2321, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 33 (1983).
2. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
3. 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
4. 104 S. Ct. at 3412.
5. Id. In Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984), the only basis for
exclusion was a technical error on behalf of the issuing magistrate; it therefore was not
necessary to resolve the issue presented to reach a resolution as broad as Leon.
6. 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961), modified, United States v. Leon, 104 S.
Ct. 3405 (1984). Interestingly, both opinions rely heavily on the concept of "common
sense." Justice Clark noted in Mapp, "There is no war between the Constitution and
common sense," and based the decision in large part on the common notion of a remedy
for violation of a right. 367 U.S. at 657, 81 S. Ct. at 1693. Justice White uses the term
common sense many times in explaining the new exclusionary sanction. This may simply
suggest that the invocation of common sense without articulation of the fundamental
values involved and the assumptions and conclusions involving those values helps very
little. It is impossible to turn such a phrase into a workable and understandable legal
doctrine without such articulation.
7. Id. at 653, 81 S. Ct. at 1691. After suggesting that the Wolf court's refusal to
adopt the exclusionary rule was "bottomed" upon factual considerations no longer valid
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Many of these researchers have concluded that the impact of
the exclusionary rule is insubstantial, but the small percentages
with which they deal mask a large absolute number of felons
who are released because the cases against them were based in
part on illegal searches or seizures. Because we find that the
rule can have no substantial deterrent effect in the sorts of
situations under consideration in this case .. .we conclude that
it cannot pay its way in those situations. s
Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion emphasized the conse-
quences of the method in referring to the decision as "unavoidably
provisional" because of the "institutional limitations on [the Court's]
ability to gather information about 'legislative facts,' and the exclu-
sionary rule." 9 He further warns, that if it should emerge from factual
experience that "the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule results
in a material change in police compliance with the Fourth Amendment,
we shall have to reconsider what we have undertaken here. The logic
of a decision that rests on untested predictions about police conduct
demands no less."' 0
After reviewing briefly many of the cases which have laid the ground-
work for an exception to the exclusionary rule" and after "weighing
the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution's case-
in-chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence obtained in reliance
on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that
ultimately is found to be defective,' '1 2 the Court concluded that "the
marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence ob-
tained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated
search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion."' 3
Justice White noted that the conclusion does not "suggest . .. that
exclusion is always inappropriate . . .where an officer has obtained a
and thus should not be followed, Justice Clark took the view that the factual considerations
are "not basically relevant" to the constitutional issue. This, of course, would preclude
reconsideration of Mapp based upon changing factual considerations (i.e. views concerning
the practical impact of the exclusionary sanction). The other justification for the exclu-
sionary rule posited in Mapp-judicial integrity-was, however, not fully developed or
explained in light of the contemporary views toward standing and attenuation which
allowed the use by criminal courts of unconstitutionally seized evidence. See, e.g., Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963). It is problematic to suggest
that Mapp was predicated primarily on a well-developed and articulated concept of "judicial
integrity."
8. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3413 n.6.
9. Id. at 3424.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 3413-16.
12. Id. at 3412-13.
13. Id. at 3421.,
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warrant and abided by its terms. . . ." [I]t is clear that in some cir-
cumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for believing
that the warrant was properly issued.""' He then noted four circumstances
when reliance on a warrant will not be considered objectively reasonable:
(1) When the magistrate was misled by relevant information in an
affidavit which was known by the affiant to be false or which he should
have known to be false as set forth in Franks v. Delaware;5 (2) When
the magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role in the manner con-
demned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York (magistrate actively partici-
pating in search/investigation); (3) When the affidavit is so lacking the
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable (the so called "bare bones" or clearly conclusory
affidavit); and (4) When a warrant is facially deficient, such as failing
to comply with the particularity requirements. 6
Having articulated the situations in which exclusion in warrant cases
is still appropriate, Justice White advised that "the prosecution should
ordinarily be able to establish objective good faith without a substantial
expenditure of judicial time.'"7 The opinion elaborated: "[I]n the absence
of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral
role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or
reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an
objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. ' ,
Leon thus adds to the Fourth Amendment analysis the need to
determine when an officer may have an objectively reasonable belief in
the existence of probable cause when a search was conducted pursuant
to a warrant which was unreasonably issued because of the absence of
probable cause.
This new dimension raises intriguing questions about the relationship
between judges issuing warrants and police, and between reviewing courts
and warrant-issuing magistrates. An officer is deemed to lack objective
good faith when the judge issues a warrant "so lacking in indicia of
probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely un-
reasonable."' 9 In terms of the limited deterrence rationale, it appears
the officer is penalized for relying upon a judge who failed to comply
with the minimal legal standards. This strained reasoning results from
14. Id.
15. The Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978), requirement that
the false information be necessary to establish probable cause does not work when there
is an absence of probable cause as Leon allows. Thus, it appears that Leon may expand
the protections of Franks to, at a minimum, "relevant" evidence.
16. Id. at 3421-22.
17. Id. at 3422.
18. Id. at 3423 (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 3422 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2265
(1975).
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Justice White's unwillingness to suggest that the exclusionary sanction
might well be an appropriate remedy for substandard judicial, as opposed
to police, action. Thus, the officer must be deemed objectively unrea-
sonable for relying upon the unreasonable actions of a judge.
In litigation this places defense counsel in the position of arguing
to a judge that the officer was objectively unreasonable for relying upon
the earlier judicial action. This is not an enviable position from which
to begin argument.
From a reviewing court perspective, the court in most cases can
simply assume the absence of probable cause and then determine whether
the officer was objectively reasonable. If the warrant application is not
flagrantly defective, 20 then the officer's action was "objectively reason-
able" and no exclusionary sanction lies, absent other sufficient grounds.
Of course, if courts generally assume the absence of probable cause,
the substantive Fourth Amendment issue is not addressed and thus Fourth
Amendment developments are frozen; more importantly, lower courts
are given no further substantive guidance. Justice White suggested that
lack of instruction to lower courts would not necessarily result "by
allowing reviewing courts to exercise an informed discretion in making
[the] choice' '2 of whether to address the principal Fourth Amendment
issue.
This aspect of the decision emphasized that the standard announced
is not one addressed to the police or issuing magistrate as are most
Fourth Amendment decisions. The standard is one for review. It remains
inappropriate for issuing magistrates or police to approach the warrant
issue in terms of whether the exclusionary sanction will apply; the proper
approach remains to determine whether there is probable cause tradi-
tionally and in light of the relaxed standard of Illinois v. Gates.2 2 To
suggest, however, that issuing magistrates will not issue warrants under
circumstances where probable cause is very doubtful but when the issuance
would not likely result in the officer being found to be objectively
unreasonable may be unrealistic.2 3 This new approach presents a substan-
20. The opinion does not fully articulate what degree of lack of probable cause
renders the warrant unreasonable for reliance by an officer. While a "bare-bones" affidavit
i.e., "bare conclusions" of others, 104 S. Ct. at 3417, may not be relied upon, it is not
certain that an affidavit that includes more than "bare-bones" but less than one in which
there is a "substantial basis for . .. concluding that probable cause existed", Illinois v.
Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1982) (citation ommitted), must lead to a reviewing court
excluding evidence. Justice White indicates a reviewing court "may" exclude. 104 S. Ct.
at 3417. It thus is not entirely clear that the reviewing standard in Leon for purposes of
determining application of the exclusionary rule is the same as that articulated in Gates
for purposes of reviewing a probable cause determination. See infra note 38.
21. Id. at 3423.
22. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983), discussed infra text accompanying notes 48-51.
23. As with "harmless error", a magistrate should not intentionally commit error.
A similar problem may exist here. See, e.g., State v. Michelli, 301 So. 2d 577 (La. 1974).
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tial challenge to the integrity of the judiciary, all of whom (including issu-
ing magistrates) are bound to support the constitutions and laws of the
state and the United States. 4 The absence of a remedy does not and should
not diminish that responsibility. State constitutional or supervisory con-
trol of this difficult problem may be appropriate.
Undoubtedly, more difficult issues will arise in connection with the
application of a "good faith" standard to non-warrant cases. While it
is clear that the holdings of Leon and Sheppard relate only to warrant
cases (and thus Mapp, a non-warrant case, has not been overruled), it
is equally clear that the opinion's author did not feel bound by the
strict holding. In an opinion 25 issued the same day as Leon and Sheppard,
Justice White, dissenting from the majority position that the exclusionary
rule does not apply to civil deportation proceedings, indicated his un-
derstanding of Leon's application to non-warrant cases: "[I1f the agents
neither knew nor should have known that they were acting contrary to
the dictates of the Fourth Amendment, evidence will not be suppressed
even if it is held that their conduct was illegal." '26 That the issue of
non-warrant application was not inadvertently addressed is evident from
Justice Stevens' dissent in which he joins Justice White's opinion except
for the portion that relies upon Leon, "[blecause the court has not yet
held that the rule of United States v. Leon . . .has any applications
to warrantless searches." 27
The test of Leon does not provide sufficient guidance in non-warrant
cases. The Court did not address the essential question of by what
standards one determines when an officer without a warrant is objectively
reasonable. The opinion does not give adequate guidance on whether
there are different concerns when an officer relies upon an unconsti-
tutional state constitutional or statutory provision, or unconstitutional
administrative rules or common practice.28 It may be that in connection
with non-warrant cases a strict objective standard that does not take
into account subjective good faith, as well as other purposes of the
exclusionary sanction, would not be acceptable. Further careful analysis
remains necessary.2 9
24. La. Const. art. X, § 30.
25. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984).
26. Id. at 3493 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 3496 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28. Justice White suggested that the exclusionary sanction still applies in cases where
a statute is unconstitutional by authorizing searches "under circumstances that did not
satisfy the traditional warrant and probable cause requirements .... ." 104 S. Ct. at
3415 n.8. However, he did not explain how this position of non-exclusion fits the limited
deterrence rationale of Leon or the difference between such authorized searches as compared
to arrests.
29. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has, in dicta, suggested
broader application of a "good faith" exception. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d
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Leon heightens the need for the Louisiana Supreme Court to de-
termine whether there exists an exclusionary sanction for article I, section
5 of the Louisiana Constitution which supplements and is independent
of the exclusionary sanction arising from the Fourth Amendment. This
writer has previously suggested ° that article I section 5, because of its
expanded standing, has an exclusionary rule beyond and independent of
the United States Constitution. In several cases the Louisiana Supreme
Court had already adopted an exclusionary sanction broader than, and
independent of, that required by the United States Supreme Court.3
There is therefore no reason to assume that the exclusionary sanction
in Louisiana must follow that of Leon and Sheppard. That issue should
be carefully and realistically addressed on a case-by-case basis to develop
a fundamentally sound solution.
"PRONGS" AND PURPOSES
If any doubt lingered about the fundamental change caused by the
"common sense" approach to probable cause announced in Illinois v.
Gates 2 last term, that doubt should be dissipated by the per curiam
opinion in Massachusetts v. Upton.33 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts had concluded,
We do not view the Gates opinion as decreeing a standardless
"totality of the circumstances" test. The informant's veracity
and the basis of his knowledge are still important but, where
the tip is adequately corroborated, they are not elements indis-
pensible [sic] to a finding of probable cause. It seems that, in
a given case, the corroboration may be so strong as to satisfy
probable cause in the absence of any other showing of the
informant's "veracity" and any direct statement of the "basis
of his knowledge." '3 4
The Massachusetts court found that the affidavit provided insuffi-
cient information to establish probable cause. It reached that conclusion
830 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1980), discussed in Lamonica, Developments
in the Law, 1979-1980-Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 41 La. L. Rev. 643, 643 (1981).
30. See Lamonica, The work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976
Term-Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 37 La. L. Rev. 535, 542 (1977).
31. See State v. Longlois, 374 So. 2d 1208 (La. 1979) (a unanimous opinion by
Blanche, J.); State v. Patton, 374 So. 2d 1211 (La. 1979); State v. Case, 363 So. 2d 486
(La. 1978). See also Lamonica, supra note 29, at 646. Cf. State v. Daniels, 373 So. 2d
149 (La. 1979); State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La. 1975), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975),
on remand 330 So. 2d 900 (La. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1977); State v. Wells,
221 So. 2d 50 (La. 1969).
32. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
33. 104 S. Ct. 2085 (1984).
34. Id. 2087 (quoting Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. 562, 568, 458 N.E.2d
717, 721 (1983)).
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primarily because there was insufficient information to corroborate the
previously untested credibility of the informant. The corroboration was
only through "innocent, nonsuspicious conduct as related to an event
that took place in public.""
The Supreme Court's per curiam attempted to amplify Gates:
We think that the . . . [Massachusetts court] misunderstood our
decision in Gates. We did not merely refine or qualify the "two-
pronged test." We rejected it as hypertechnical and divorced
from "the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act." . . . We noted in Gates that "the two-pronged test has
encouraged an excessive dissection of informants' tips, with un-
due attention being focused on isolated issues that cannot sen-
sibly be divorced from other facts presented to the magistrate." '3 6
The error of the Massachusetts court appears to be its insistence
"on judging bits and pieces of information in isolation against the
artificial standards provided by the two-pronged test." '3 7 It also erred
in failing to defer to the issuing magistrate. 38
When one examines the Supreme Court's approval of the affidavit,
however, it appears that the error may be more in terms of application
than in fundamental concepts. In finding probable cause, the court
looked to facts which justified reliance upon the informant's tip. With
respect to the manner in which the information was obtained (relia-
bility),3 9 the first-hand observation easily satisfied the traditional re-
quirement. Thus, the critical issue was the informant's credibility. The
Supreme Court examined this question analytically in a traditional man-
ner. The informant provided a reasonable basis (including motive) to
believe she was telling the truth, and to justify initial anonymity: "fear
of Upton's retaliation . . . her recent breakup with Upton and her
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2087-88 (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 2088.
38. Id. The Court in Gates addressed the now distinct roles of the issuing magistrate
and reviewing court: "The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . .
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found . . .
[Tlhe duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial
basis for . . . conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed." 103 S. Ct. at 2332 (citations
omitted).
39. The term "reliability" is not consistently used; it often refers to the total question
of whether the informant has provided truthful information (and thus is credible and has
obtained it in a dependable manner). Sometimes when there is a focus on the manner
of obtaining information alone, the question is addressed to the method of obtaining the
information (firsthand or hearsay). See, e.g., Lamonica, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 36 La. L. Rev.
575, 579 (1976).
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desire 'to burn him." '' 40 Additionally, the informant confirmed the of-
ficer's guess as to her identity.41
The court thus appears to have considered the same indicia of
credibility as it did prior to Gates. While the Court has declared the
two-pronged test to be an "artificial standard," the Court appears to
be determining probable cause by looking in a less stringent manner at
the underlying purposes of the traditional test. 42 That is appropriate
since the underlying conceptual concerns hardly can be characterized as
"artificial." In any evidentiary situation, a reasonable person considers
the (known or assumed) truth-telling propensity of the declarant and
the basis or reliability of the manner in which the information was
obtained before relying upon it: the earth-bound Bishop who says that
the other side of the moon is made of green cheese reasonably can be
relied upon no more than the habitual liar who says he personally "put
the check in the mail." Credibility and the manner of obtaining infor-
mation are distinct. It hardly can be said that the purposes of the "two
prongs" are artificial. Rather, the purposes conform to "the factual
and practical considerations of everyday life on which resonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act." ' 43 Of course, the two purposes
are often blurred as when the credibility is established by corroboration
of the facts stated, or when the degree of detail of facts presented is
such that one reasonably may infer first-hand observation or if corro-
boration confirms truth-telling propensity. 44
Of great substantive significance is the court's willingness in Gates
to allow greater reliance when "a particular informant is known for
the unusual reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal
activities in a locality. ' 45 The Court is willing to allow greater interplay
between credibility concerns and the method of obtaining the infor-
mation: "a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining
the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or
by some other indicia of reliability [that the information presented is
likely to be true, like corroboration or degree of detail]." ' 46 The Court
appears willing to assume that people who have given truthful infor-
mation about criminal conduct in the past are likely to provide truthful
information in the present. Implicit in that conclusion is that the in-
formants also used adequate means of obtaining the information in the
40. 104 S. Ct. at 2088.
41. Id.
42. See supra note 38.
43. 103 S. Ct. at 2328 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).
44. See Justice Tate's early recognition of the need for a flexible view of the two-
prong test in State v. Paciera, 290 So. 2d 681 (La. 1974).
45. 103 S. Ct. at 2329.
46. Id.
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present, as in the past. 47 How far that assumption will extend will, of
course, be controlled by future developments and could result in pro-
found changes.
In Gates itself the court took a rather traditional evidentiary ap-
proach. It concluded, "[wie agree . . . that an informant's 'veracity,'
'reliability' and 'basis of knowledge' are all highly relevant in determining
the value of his report.' '48 The disagreement was whether the two-pronged
test was to be "rigidly exacted" 49 and whether the two prongs are
"entirely separate and independent requirements." 50 The Court recog-
nized that the separate concerns are "closely intertwined issues that may
usefully illuminate the common sense, practical question whether there
is probable cause . . ... , Stated differently, the court reminded us
that we should not, as in any area of the law, lose sight of the purpose
of the rule and its conceptual basis and decide cases based on inflexible
applications which do not always promote the rule's purpose. Keeping
the two purposes, of the "two prongs" in mind should help deal with
an otherwise apparently unstructured "totality of the circumstances"
test.
State v. Ruffin 2 is an example of Louisiana's response to Gates.
A detective received a telephone call from a confidential informant who
said that Ruffin would be standing at a particular intersection, possessing
a stolen check in a large amount. The informant told the detective that
Ruffin was attempting to get someone to accompany him to cash the
check. The detective knew Ruffin had been incarcerated in the past.
The detective had received truthful information from the informant in
the past which resulted in thirty to forty convictions. Based on this the
detective obtained a warrant.
Reversing the court of appeal,53 the Louisiana Supreme Court de-
termined that there was no probable cause because of the absence of
47. See the court's citation of Judge Clark's opinion in United States v. Sellers, 483
F.2d 37 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. at 908 (1973). See also Gates, 103 S. Ct. at
2330 n.9, which illustrates the contrary "rigid-application" approach. The court does not
elaborate on distinctions between "professional" and "non-professional" informants. See,
e.g., State v. Searle, 339 So. 2d 1194 (La. 1976), discussed in Lamonica, The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 37
La. L. Rev. 535, 538 (1977).
48. 103 S. Ct. at 2327.
49. Id. at 2328.
50. Id. at 2327-28.
51. Id. at 2328.
52. 448 So. 2d 1274 (1984). See also, State v. Raheem, 454 So. 2d 214 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1984); State v. Stewart, 452 So. 2d 186 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984); State v.
Fleniken, 451 So. 2d 1342 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984); State v. Manso, 449 So. 2d 480
(La, 1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3237 (1984); State v. Kleinpeter, 449 So. 2d 1043
(La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 450 So. 2d 661 (La. 1984).
53. 434 So. 2d 1246 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
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any "indication in the informant's statement that the informant had
personal knowledge ' 5 4 of the facts he represented. The corroborated
facts involved only the location of the defendant on a public street.
Justice Blanche, writing for the majority, recognized that
in expressing that the test to be utilized should be an examination
of the totality of circumstances, the Court did not abandon the
need for an examaination of the two prong test of Aguillar-
Spinelli. Rather instead of mechanical application . . . each
prong should still be examined as a separate factor contributing
to the totality of the circumstances."
Ruffin does not appear inconsistent with the Upton result. Upton
dealt with facts bearing on credibility; the informant asserted personal
knowledge plus specific details from which personal knowledge could
be inferred. In Ruffin, there were facts traditionally accepted as indicative
of credibility, but no information on how the information was obtained.
Interestingly, Ruffin appears predicated on both the state and federal
constitutions .6 This reliance on both constitutions is now less likely to
preclude the Supreme Court from reviewing the federal grounds. 7 Justice
Stevens, concurring in Upton made some interesting and perhaps in-
creasingly significant observations regarding federal-state relations relat-
ing to the Fourth Amendment and review by the Supreme Court. He
urged that it is "important that state judges do not unnecessarily invite
this Court to undertake review of state court judgments." 58 In urging
state courts to first decide Fourth Amendment issues on state grounds,
he reminds us that
for the first century of this nation's history, the Bill of Rights
of the Constitution of the United States was solely a protection
for the individual in relation to federal authorities. State con-
stitutions protected the liberties of the people of the several
States from abuse by state authorities. . . . The States . . .
remain the primary guardian of the liberty of the people. 9
Justice Stevens is urging state courts to base their decisions on their own
constitutions if they desire to provide more expansive or more consistent
protections with those of the last two decades. This limits federal review
and reduces the work load of both federal courts initially and state courts
on possible reversal, remand, or both. In the process of redefining prob-
54. 448 So. 2d at 1279.
55. Id. at 1278.
56. Id. at 1277.
57. Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
58. 104 S. Ct. at 2090 (Stewart, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 2091.
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able cause, Justice Steven's suggestion might well provide greater certainty
within the state court system at this stage in the development of new doc-
trines by the United States Supreme Court.
MURDER SCENE SEARCHEs-le mort saisit le consentment?
Justice Stewart, writing for a unanimous Court in Mincey v. Arizona,6"
recognized an emergency exception to the warrant requirement:
We do not question the right of police to respond to emergency
situations. Numerous state and federal cases have recognized
that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police from making
warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe
that a person within is in need of immediate aid. Similarly,
when the police come upon the scene of a homicide they may
make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there
are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises. 61
The Court found that the search in question exceeded the emergency
justification: "All the persons in Mincey's apartment had been located
before the investigating officers arrived . . . . And a four-day search
that included opening dresser drawers and ripping up carpets can hardly
be rationalized in terms of the legitimate concerns that justify an emer-
gency. "62
State v. Thompson63 added a new dimension to emergency search
cases. In a majority opinion subscribed to by four members of the
court, Justice Blanche distinguished Mincey not only on its facts relevant
to the legitimate concerns that justify an emergency case, but also on
the basis that the victim in Mincey "could not have consented to the
search of the apartment he was shot in, as he had no authority over
that apartment. . . . [The victim in Thompson] had authority over the
premises . . . and, had he survived until the police arrived, could have
consented to their search . . . ."64 The notion of implied consent by
a victim is interesting, but it directs the focus of analysis away from
the traditional emergency exceptions. Justice Lemmon's concurrence,
emphasizing that "when a resident of the premises is murdered, there
is a significant diminishing of the expectations of privacy of the other
60. 437 U.S. 385, 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978).
61. Id. at 392, 98 S. Ct. at 2413.
62. Id. at 393, 98 S. Ct. at 2414.
63. 448 So. 2d 666 (La. 1984).
64. Id. at 671. Reliance on consent will no doubt result in far-ranging legal issues.
In Thompson, the defendant was a wife who attempted suicide. Presumptively the home
was community property and owned one-half by the wife with the remaining one-half
becoming subject to her usufruct upon the victim's death. Such ownership concerns are
irrelevant and only add confusion.
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persons residing there," ' 65 is more realistic and focuses on the real issue:
reasonable protection of privacy. That reasonable people can disagree
on factual applications of the test is reflected in Justice Dennis' dissent. 66
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Thompson
and, without hearing, reversed the court in a unanimous per curiam
which ignored the consent theory other than as an aspect of diminished
expectancy of privacy. In rejecting the diminished expectancy of privacy,
the court indicated that neither the length of time (two hours versus
four days), the request for medical assistance, nor the unavailability of
a person with authority over the premises justified the warrantless search. 67
Thompson also clarified a procedural issue raised in State v. Landry.61
In Landry the court ruled that the state may not put on additional
evidence in opposition to a motion to suppress after the motion to
suppress is granted. The decision also indicated that the defendant is
likewise prohibited from presenting new evidence supporting the motion
to suppress once the trial court denies the motion. In Thompson, the
defendant did not attempt to introduce new evidence but sought "rear-
gument and reconsideration of his motion based upon the evidence
previously introduced." 69 The court found the reconsideration to be in
order but instructed that such reconsiderations "should be sparingly
made and limited to instances when the trial judge firmly believes that
his prior decision was legally infirm .... -70 The reason given for such
a rehearing was that "such reconsiderations do not hamper, but actually
promote, judicial efficiency." 7 ' Justice Blanche's appropriate reasoning
on this procedural issue should also be employed in cases involving
reasonable and non-dilatory attempts to produce additional evidence.
The little additional time in appropriate cases could prove greatly efficient
in eliminating state and federal collateral attacks on the suppression
issue,72 as well as reducing attacks on the additional issue of competency
of counsel likely to arise therefrom. As in civil proceedings, the issue
should be resolved directly in terms of judicial efficiency and fairness.
65. Id. at 672 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 673 (Dennis, J., dissenting). A closely related issue involving premises
searched after fires was addressed in Michigan v. Clifford, 104 S. Ct. 641 (1984). The
5-4 plurality opinion reflects the difficulty of determining the types of emergency circum-
stances in which a person retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in his house.
67. Thompson v. Louisiana, 105 S. Ct. 409 (1984).
68. 339 So. 2d 8 (La. 1976).
69. 448 So. 2d at 669.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. This is particularly relevant to the issue in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.
Ct. 3037 (1976), of whether the state prescribed "an opportunity for a full and fair
litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim .... ." 428 U.S. at 482, 96 S. Ct. at 3046.
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AIRPORT SEARCHES
In State v. Ossey7" the Louisiana Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision,
addressed the continuing problem of airport searches and, in the process,
announced their understanding of the leading United States Supreme
Court plurality decision 74 involving airport searches. In Ossey the de-
fendant, after (1) deplaning from a source city (Los Angeles), was (2)
observed to be nervous, hesitant and looking over his shoulder, and (3)
he then retrieved one small leather bag. He was approached by a plain-
clothes narcotics agent who asked if the defendant would speak to him.
He responded affirmatively and was asked to produce identification. He
produced (4) a driver's license that was in a name other than that on
his (5) one-way ticket which was (6) purchased with cash. His explanation
for the "alias" was that a cousin had purchased the ticket. The num-
bered facts conformed to a "drug courier profile." The officers
then advised the defendant that they were conducting a narcotics in-
vestigation and that they believed he was transporting narcotics. When
asked if he would consent to a search, defendant asked to see a search
warrant. The officers informed defendant they would obtain one if the
defendant would accompany them to a third floor office. The agents
testified that upon reaching the office the defendant consented to the
search. Although the officers testified they thought the defendant had
signed a consent to search form, he had not.
The case demonstrates the significance of the factual-legal deter-
mination of when a "seizure" takes place. Justice Dixon, writing in
dissent, while stating his willingness to accept "the officers' version of
the events, '75 recognized the case as "one which lies somehwere between
Mendenhall and Royer ' 76 insofar as the critical determination of when
a seizure, based upon sufficient information, properly may take place.
A significant disagreement between the dissent and majority related to
the extent one considers that question purely one of fact. Justice Marcus,
writing a rather cryptic opinion for the majority, was not willing to
second-guess the trial judge's conclusion that "the defendant voluntarily
accompanied the agents in a spirit of apparent cooperation. ' 77 That
finding is apparently the basis for his conclusion that in light of the
"surrounding circumstances ' 78 the defendant "was not being illegally
detained ' 79 at the time he consented to the search.
73. State v. Ossey, 446 So. 2d 280 (La. 1984).
74. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983). See also United States
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S. Ct. 1870, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 908 (1980).
75. 446 So. 2d at 289.
76. Id. at 291.
77. Id. at 286.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 286-87.
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Justice Dixon stated that "Ossey, like Royer, was justified in be-
lieving he was not free to leave . . . and, as a practical matter . . .
was probably under arrest . . . . " Justice Dixon concluded that "[als
a matter of law, any consent given . . . ought to be held to be
impermissibly tainted by his illegal detention."'"
The critical issue in such cases is whether a defendant "voluntarily
accompanies" the officer. That question is complex because the indi-
vidual-government confrontation often begins as a consensual questioning
in a public place and escalates into a limited seizure when one no longer
reasonably feels free to walk away and often escalates into a more
significant seizure (arrest) when the limits of the Terry-stop seizure have
been reached. The defendant can, of course, consent to each seizure,
even if not legally justified. The essential question in Ossey is whether
the defendant consented to the continued custody. If so, there simply is
no illegality-as the majority accepted and with which the dissent disagrees.
Without clear guidelines as to the manner of obtaining consent during
the different degrees of seizure, a "totality of circumstances" test will
continue to present difficult fact-finding situations, and it enhances the
need to cause a complete record to be produced.
OPEN FIELDS
Former Chief Justice Sanders in a well-reasoned, unanimous opinion
concluded: "[Plain view] does not apply if the view is from a place
that officers have no right to be . . . . The point of observation
(trespassing on a fenced and posted 640 acre tract) was a place that
the officers had no right to be without a search warrant." 2 The decision
was clearly predicated upon the proposition that the officers, by being
in a place they had no right and no legal justification to be, were
violating the constitutional privacy expectations of the defendants who
had property interests and had taken steps to assure their privacy.
In a potentially very significant decision, the Supreme Court has
announced that persons lack a Fourth Amendment protected interest in
"open fields" even when "no trespassing" signs are posted and the
area is secluded.83 Looking at James Madison's original proposal for
the Fourth Amendment, and the rejection of his term "property" in
favor of "effects," the Court determined the term "effects" to be less
inclusive than "property. '8 4 Perhaps of more significance is the Court's
80. Id. at 292 (Dixon, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (citations omitted).
82. State v. Byers, 359 So. 2d 84 (La. 1978), discussed in Lamonica, The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term-Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 39
La. L. Rev. 917, 921 (1979).
83. Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
84. Id. at 1740.
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treatment of the Katz 5 approach to ascertaining Fourth Amendment
protections, i.e., "reasonable expectations of privacy." The Court re-
embraced the pre-Katz rule of Hester v. United States8 6 and explained
that it "may be understood as providing that an individual may not
legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in
fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home."'8 7 In
reaffirming this old position, the Court found that "open fields do not
provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is
intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance." 88 The
asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not an expectation that
society currently recognizes as reasonable. 9 Thus, the Katz formulation
was used to restrict privacy interests rather than expand them.
This approach to the Fourth Amendment gives new life to deter-
minations of what activity is within the "curtilage." Even then, it appears
that activity within the curtilage must meet the additional test of being
conducted in such a manner as to create a reasonable expectation of
privacy to avoid the "plain view" aspect of Fourth Amendment pro-
tections. Unquestionably, Oliver has significantly limited the class of
cases to which Fourth Amendment protections apply and causes greater
emphasis on the express language of the Fourth Amendment-"persons,
houses, papers, effects." In a footnote, we are told, "[tihe Framers
would have understood the term 'effects' to be limited to personal,
rather than real, property." 9 .
Justice Marshall, in dissent, pointed out that "[w]e are not told
. . whether the curtilage is a 'house' or an 'effect'-or why, if the
curtilage can be incorporated . . . a field cannot" 91 in light of the
literal approach to the issue. If this literal approach is taken, enclosures
outside of the "curtilage" but on large tracts of property will lack any
privacy protections,-e.g., sheds and barns not located near the home
or simply materials (hay stacks, supplies) covered with non-transparent
material and located outside of the traditional "curtilage."
The Louisiana Constitution's framers may have fared better than
James Madison in this respect. Article I, section 5 expressly provides
greater privacy protection which, in addition to "persons, houses, and
effects," includes "property and communications." The results reached
in Byers, while not predicated on the express language, is consistent
with the language and need not be altered by Oliver.
85. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967).
86. 265 U.S. 57, 44 S. Ct, 445 (1924).
87. 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1741.
90. Id. at 1740 n'7.
91. Id. at 1745 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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WARRANTLESS ARRESTS IN THE HOME
The Payton v. New York9 2 holding that, absent probable cause and
exigent circumstances, warrantless arrests in the home violate the Fourth
Amendment was amplified in Welsh v. Wisconsin.93 The Court was
presented with the question of whether "the Fourth Amendment prohibits
the police from making a warrantless night entry of a person's home
in order to arrest him for violation of a nonjailable traffic offense." ' 94
While the holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibition of such
conduct is necessarily narrow, the dictum is broad in explaining the
meaning of the Payton exigent circumstances standard. After recounting
the traditional exigent circumstances justifying warrantless arrests, Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, added a newly articulated consid-
eration: "Our hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially when
warrantless arrests in the home are at issue, is especially appropriate
when the underlying offense for which there is probable cause to arrest
is relatively minor." 91
The Court then
holdis] that an important factor to be considered when deter-
mining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the under-
lying offense for which the arrest is being made . . . . A home
entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause
to believe that only a minor offense . . . has been committed. 96
Of significance in the driving-while-intoxicated context, was the
Court's unwillingness to find a continuous or "hot" pursuit or a con-
tinuing threat to public safety. The justification of preserving evidence,
however, was more narrowly treated. Justice Brennan looked at the
"expression of the state's interest'' 97 in the particular crime by the
leniency of the sanction. In light of this lesser interest, he concluded
that "a warrantless home [entry] arrest cannot be upheld simply because
evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohol level might have dissipated
while the police obtained a warrant." 9 It is not clear that the same
position with respect to preservation of evidence will prevail when a
state, such as Louisiana, has expressed a stronger interest by enacting
more stringent penalties.
92. 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980).
93. 104 S. Ct. 2091 (1984).
94. Id. at 2093.
95. Id. at 2098.
96. Id. at 2099.
97. Id. at 2100.
98. Id. (citation omitted).
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CONFESSIONS
While reiterating traditional confession-voluntariness standards, State
v. Wilms" presents a troubling application. The defendant was arrested
as he fled toward his van after an armed robbery. His wife, who was
in the van, was also arrested. Unrebutted testimony reflected that an
officer hit the wife in the stomach and kicked her as she was climbing
into the police van. Another officer conducting the interrogation was
told of the battery and that the wife was bleeding. A female guard also
told the interrogating officer of the need for medical attention. When
the wife was finally examined some eight hours after the arrest she was
found to be "spotting" and bleeding. A miscarriage occurred eight days
later.
Chief Justice Dixon, writing for the majority, found that "[tihere
is no doubt based on the present record that [the wife] was inexcusably
struck in the stomach."'" He rejected the involuntariness of confession
claim because "[nJeither Wilms or his wife testified . . . that they were
afraid of further misconduct . . . Wilms fear was that [his wife] would
not receive medical attention."'' There was no doubt that this fear was
expressed to the interrogating officer who knew of the wife's condition.
The majority opinion found it significant that the interrogating
officer affirmatively "did not predicate medical service on the giving of
a statement"' 02 even though there was an inordinate delay. While re-
cognizing that the defendant "was no doubt concerned about his wife
and experienced psychological pressure,"'0 3 the court found he "was no
doubt also feeling pressure as a result of being apprehended in front
of a restaurant as a suspect in an armed robbery."' 4
The decision does not appear to implement the long-standing rule
that "the state is required to rebut specific testimony introduced on
behalf of the defendant concerning factual circumstances which indicates
coercive measure or intimidation."''05 It is also difficult to reconcile with
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:451, which has long required the state to
affirmatively show that a confession was "free and voluntary and not
made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats,
inducements or promises," by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.' 6
99. 449 So. 2d 442 (La. 1982).
100. Id. at 444.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 445.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. State v. Monroe, 305 So. 2d 902, 912 (La. 1974). See also State v. Peters, 315
So. 2d 678 (La. 1975).
106. See, e.g., State v. Joseph, 217 La. 175, 46 So. 2d 118 (1950); State v. Lanthier,
201 La. 844, 10 So. 2d 638 (1942).
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Since the trial judge assigned neither written nor oral reasons for
his decision, it is difficult to reconcile the supreme court's action with
an appropriate deference to the trial court's findings. Moreover, the
record appears devoid of information relating to whether the trial judge
applied the appropriate legal standard. Wilms thus appears to be a
significant deviation from prior Louisiana cases. Justice Lemmon, in
dissent, warns that the court's decision "not only encourages such abusive
conduct, but also departs from any commonsense view of 'voluntari-
ness."'107
In Crosby' guilty-plea cases, such as Wilms, the state will not be
unduly prejudiced by a remand to the district court for further hearing,
findings or both to assure that the long-standing protections associated
with the manner of obtaining confessions are not rendered illusory.
MIRANDA DEVELOPMENTS
New York v. Quarles" 9 presents the question of whether there is a
Miranda violation when officers, prior to the required warning, asked
an arrestee "where the gun was."" 0 The reply resulted in locating the
gun and introducing it into evidence along with the reply. The majority
appeared eager to find a clear Miranda application even though two
substantial Miranda application questions arose: (1) whether the ques-
tioning was investigatory; and (2) whether Miranda was applicable to
non-testimonial (physical) evidence. In an uncharacteristically cryptic
expansion of federal constitutional rights, Justice Rehnquist, writing for
five members of the Court, concluded the lower court "was undoubtedly
correct in deciding that the facts of this case came within the ambit of
the Miranda decision as we have subsequently interpreted it."' The
majority opinion then proceeded to create a "public safety" exception
to Miranda: "We hold that on these facts there is a 'public safety'
exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a
suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence, and that the availability
of that exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual
officers involved.""' 2 The majority opinion emphasizes the limited nature
of the factual inquiry, "the application of the exception . . . should
not be made to depend on post hoc findings at a suppression hearing
concerning the subjective motivation of the arresting officer."" 3
107. 449 So. 2d at 445 (Lemmon, J., dissenting).
108. State v. Crosby, 338 So. 2d 584 (La. 1976), allows the acceptance of a guilty
plea with reservation of the right to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress.
109. 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
110. Id. at 2630. The court also did not address the "inevitable discovery" issue. Id.
at 2634 n.9.
111. Id. at 2631.
112. Id. at 2632.
113. Id.
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Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that "undoubtedly most police of-
ficers . . .would act out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely
unverifiable motives-their own safety, safety of others, and perhaps as
well the desire to obtain incriminating evidence from the suspect.""14
Motivation becomes irrelevant because the majority concluded that "the
doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda [do not] require that it be applied
in all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions
reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety."",
This approach to the issue, while at first glance appearing to expand
Miranda application, has the effect of avoiding picking up any of the
aspects of Miranda baggage which may concern subjective intent. One
may assume custody, assume interrogation, assume application to non-
testimonial evidence and simply ask whether the questioning was, by an
objective standard acknowledging a police officer's instinct as central,
"reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety [including his
own].'' 16
Justice O'Connor dissented in part and concurred in part to em-
phasize that the court did not need to reach the non-testimonial evidence
issue. She emphasized the need for careful examination before one should
be willing to assume that the Fifth Amendment Miranda protections
apply to non-testimonial evidence." 17
The Louisiana position in State v. Levy," 8 announced by former
Justice Tate, while reaching the same result as Quarles, is not predicated
upon the assumption that Miranda applies to such inquiries, thus creating
a need for an "exception." Looking to the purpose of Miranda, the
court determined that under certain narrow circumstances-(l) a limited
threshold inquiry (2) at the scene (3) immediately after a violent crime
was committed-the question "Where is the gun?" (motivated primarily
by the officers desire to protect himself from harm) did not require
Miranda warnings." 9 Significantly, the Louisiana approach is narrowly
limited and would still allow inquiry into motivation. Quarles defers much
more to the officer's judgment-"[w]e think police officers can and will
distinguish almost instinctively""'2 between public safety questioning and
interrogation-yet disallows questioning regarding motivation.
In Berkermer v. McCarty21 the Court resolved the "confusion in
the federal and state courts regarding the applicability of . . .Miranda
to interrogations involving minor offenses . . . and to questioning of
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2634 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
118. 292 So. 2d 220 (La. 1974).
119. 292 So. 2d at 221.
120. 104 S. Ct. at 2633 (emphasis added).
121. 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984).
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motorists detained pursuant to traffic stops.' ' 2  Justice Marshall, writing
for the Court, with all other justices joining in the opinion except Justice
Stevens who concurred, concluded that a person subjected to custodial
interrogation is entitled to the protections of Miranda regardless of the
nature or severity of the offense for which he is arrested or of which
he is suspected. The Court, however, refused to interpret the language
of Miranda literally ("or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way")" 3 to hold that every detained motorist must
be advised of his rights before being questioned. The Court found such
a detention to be "presumptively temporary and brief"' 124 and "not such
that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police.' 25
Of at least equal significance is the Court's dictum indicating that
Miranda is not applicable to Terry stops. "The comparatively nonthrea-
tening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any
suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates
of Miranda."'126 Thus Terry stops are not deemed to be custodial for
the purposes of Miranda. Only when a non-traffic detention exceeds
that of a forcible stop does Miranda become applicable. In traffic stops,
even though they are often more intensive seizures than Terry stops,
Miranda does not apply because of the presumptively temporary and
brief nature of the encounter. We are told, however, that when a motorist
"is subjected to treatment that renders him 'in custody' for practical
purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of' ' 2 7 Miranda pro-
tections. Presumptively, the same standard would apply to Terry stops
to provide Miranda protections at the point the detainee's freedom of
action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. 2 The often
difficult factual distinction between a "forcible" stop and a "formal
arrest" becomes even more important.' 29 The distinction is often more
difficult to ascertain in the "low visibility" of the street encounters of
non-traffic related forcible stops.
The consciously express and seemingly clear language of Article I,
Section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution, making the Miranda-type
warning apply to an arrest "or detention," has thus far been restrictively
interpreted to require a "significant detention"' 30 in light of the "totality
122. Id. at 3144 (citations omitted).
123. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966).
124. Berkermer, 104 S. Ct. at 3149.
125.. Id. at 3150.
126. Id. at 3151.
127. Id.
128. Id. (citations omitted).
129. Justice Marshall recognized that "[a]dmittedly, our adherence to the doctrine jtfst
recounted will mean that the police and lower courts will continue occasionally to have
difficulty deciding exactly when a suspect has been taken into custody." Id. at 3151.
130. See Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,
35 La. L. Rev. 1, 41 (1974).
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of circumstances.""' It is not clear whether the Louisiana standard and
federal standard will be held to be the same. The express language of
Article I, Section 13 would seem to require a more expansive Louisiana
interpretation. However, even if Louisiana does adopt a more expansive
interpretation, that does not mean that an exclusionary sanction would
apply automatically.
INEVITABLE DISCOVERY
When Brewer v. Williams 32 was announced in 1977 addressing the
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel which was violated as
a result of the "Christian burial" speech by an officer, the Court in
a footnote instructed, "evidence of where the body was found and of
its conditions might well be admissible on the theory that the body
would have been discovered in any event, even had incriminating state-
ments not been elicited from Williams."' On retrial, the state court
recognized the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule,
and Williams was again convicted. 13 4 In Nix v. Williams,' the Supreme
Court adopted "the so-called ultimate or inevitable discovery exception
to the Exclusionary Rule."' 13 6 The Court concluded that "[e]xclusion of
physical evidence that would inevitably have been discovered adds noth-
ing to either the integrity or fairness of a criminal trial.' ' 37 In so deciding,
the Court avoided addressing whether the Fourth Amendment rationale
of Stone v. Powell' should be extended to bar federal habeas corpus
review of Sixth Amendment claims. 39
Significantly, the Court announced that the burden of proof to
establish inevitable discovery was "no greater burden than proof by a
preponderance of the evidence"' 40 and that the clear and convincing
evidence standard was inappropriate because "inevitable discovery in-
volves no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical
facts capable of ready verification or impeachment . . .,141 Justice
Stevens, concurring, further explained, "an extraordinary burden of
proof is not needed in order to preserve the defendant's ability to subject
131. State v. Menne, 380 So. 2d 14 (La. 1980). See also State v. Thompson, 399 So.
2d 1161 (La. 1981) and Justice Dennis' dissent in Thompson, 400 So. 2d 1080 (La. 1981).
132. 430 U.S. 387, 97 S. Ct. 1232, reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 925, 97 S. Ct. 2200 (1977).
133. Id. at 407 n.12, 97 S. Ct. at 1243 n.12.
134. The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed. State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248 (1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 921 (1980).
135. 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984).
136. Id. at 2507.
137. Id. at 2510.
138. 428 U.S. 465, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976).
139. Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2512 n.7.
140. Id. at 2509 n.5 (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178 n.14 (1974)).
141. Id. at 2510 n.5.
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the prosecutions's case to the meaningful adversarial testing required by
the Sixth Amendment."'
' 42
One can expect that Nix will encourage the state in Fourth, 43 Fifth
(including Miranda), and Sixth Amendment cases to rely more often on
the now clearly accepted "inevitable discovery" doctrine. In light of the
minimal burden of proof, the fact-finding process will require great care.
142. Id. at 2516 n.8 (Stevens, J., concurring).
143. It appears that Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976), would
prevent most federal collateral review of the Fourth Amendment "inevitable discovery"
decisions of state courts.
